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Ever since Aristotle identiﬁed that the “true forms of government, there-
fore, are those in which the one, the few, or the many govern with a view to
the common interests,” political philosophers and practitioners have been
concerned about corrupt governments: those perverted forms that “rule
with a view to the private interest” (1996, book III, 1279a, pp. 29–33). Aris-
totle, Polybius, Machiavelli and the sixteenth-century Italians, Harrington
and the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English writers who became
known as Whigs or commonwealthmen, and Madison, Hamilton, and
other American founders all grappled with the problem of corruption.
Their search for an incorruptible form of true government required that
they understand how corruption perverted government. Their ideas about
corruption ranged from the moral and ethical values of princes and people
to features of legal systems and political institutions. In the late seven-
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The Concept of Systematic
Corruption in American History
John Joseph Wallis
What is really educational and beneﬁcial to students of history
is the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent
power of choosing the better policy in a particular case. Now
in every practical undertaking by a state we must regard as the
most powerful agent for success or failure the form of its con-
stitution; for from this as from a fountainhead all conceptions
and plans of action not only proceed, but attain their consum-
mation.
—The Histories of Polybius, Book VI
John Joseph Wallis is a professor of economics at the University of Maryland and a re-
search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
This paper originated in a series of conversations with Claudia Goldin, whom I gratefully ac-
knowledge. Without her support and encouragement it never would have been written. Ed
Glaeser challenged me to extend the paper further back in time, a license I took advantage of.
Conversations with Naomi Lamoreaux, Lee Alston, Steve Webb, and William Novak, as well
as the discussion of Morton Keller at the ﬁrst preconference, while not speciﬁcally on the topic
of this paper, were nonetheless extremely helpful, as were Professor Keller’s comments at the ﬁ-
nal conference. At a critical time, Jeﬀ Smith, Sally Snyder, and Barbara Gill forced me to be
more precise about the concept of systematic corruption. The seminar in Early American His-
tory at the University of Maryland gave me a valuable opportunity to present the paper to his-
torians, and their comments were invaluable. Seminars at the Mercatus Center at George Ma-
son University, the economics departments at the University of Maryland, Stanford University,
and the University of California at Irvine, the World Bank, and Universidad Carlos III pro-
vided stimulating discussion. This research was supported by National Science Foundation
grants SBR-9709490, SES-0078849, and SES-0241699 Finally, the central idea in the paper de-
veloped in conjunction with my ongoing conversations with Barry Weingast and Doug North.teenth and early eighteenth century a speciﬁc concept of corruption, which
I call “systematic corruption,” crystallized in Britain and spread to the
American colonies and France. Having identiﬁed the disease, all three so-
cieties spent a century or more designing and implementing constitutional
reforms to protect their political systems against systematic corruption.
Balanced or mixed government was the cure. Modern economic develop-
ment was the result.
The reawakening of interest among economists about the role that po-
litical institutions play in determining economic performance has stimu-
lated a renewed interest in the quality of governance and corruption. While
corruption did not disappear from twentieth-century American politics, it
has ceased to be a major concern. Concerns over corruption disappeared
from American politics because Americans ﬁgured out how to control it.
This suggests that a longer view of American history may oﬀer insights
into how economic and political institutions curb corruption.
The original idea behind this volume was to examine only the Progressive
Era, but Americans began grappling with corruption long before the 1890s.
As it turns out, Progressive Era reformers and twenty-ﬁrst-century econo-
mists think about corruption in a way that is, in one critical dimension, 180
degrees removed from the concept of corruption that prevailed until the
mid-nineteenth century. The title of McCormick’s essay, “The Discovery
that Business Corrupts Politics,” captures the essence of the modern concept
of corruption, or, as Shleifer and Vishny deﬁne corruption, “the sale by gov-
ernment oﬃcials of government property for personal gain” (1993, p. 599).1
In contrast, eighteenth-century British—English, Scotch, Irish, and
American—political thinkers worried much more that the king and his
ministers were manipulating grants of economic privileges to secure polit-
ical support for a corrupt and unconstitutional usurpation of government
powers. The commonwealth indictment of corruption in British govern-
ment accused the Executive of subordinating parliamentary independence
by granting economic privilege in a way that eroded balanced government
and, with it, checks on the crown.
Commonwealth thinking shaped American colonial political thought
and prepared the colonists to interpret the actions of Crown and Parlia-
ment after 1763 as unconstitutional threats to their fundamental liberties
as British citizens. Once independent, Americans worried continuously
about their governments and how to design their political institutions to
limit corruption.2
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1. For other treatments of corruption see Klitgaard (1988); Rose-Ackerman (1978); and
Clague (2003).
2. “In the process, the rhetoric of corruption emerged as the common grammar of politics,
so overwhelming that it became diﬃcult to discuss public questions in any other language.
The age of Jeﬀerson bequeathed to the United States an obsession with corruption that still
deeply colors the way we think about politics” (Murrin 1994, p. 104).What I deﬁne as systematic corruption is both a concrete form of politi-
cal behavior and an idea. In polities plagued with systematic corruption,
ag r oup of politicians deliberately create rents by limiting entry into valu-
able economic activities, through grants of monopoly, restrictive corporate
charters, tariﬀs, quotas, regulations, and the like. These rents bind the in-
terests of the recipients to the politicians who create them. The purpose is
to build a coalition that can dominate the government. Manipulating the
economy for political ends is systematic corruption. Systematic corruption
occurs when politics corrupts economics.
In contrast, venal corruption denotes the pursuit of private economic
interests through the political process. Venal corruption occurs when
economics corrupts politics. Classical thinkers worried about venal cor-
ruption, too. They talked at great length about the moral and ethical
corruption of entire peoples and societies, as well as governments. They re-
alized, however, that venal corruption is an inevitable result of human na-
ture. So they focused their intellectual enterprise on designing and then
protecting a form of government that could resist systematic corruption.
By eliminating systematic corruption, they hoped to mitigate the problems
of venal corruption as well.
The economic consequences of systematic corruption are enormous. Ve-
nal corruption, by comparison, is small potatoes in terms of social welfare
and economic growth. Systematically corrupt governments are rent creat-
ing, not rent seeking, governments. The survival of a systematically cor-
rupt government depends on limiting access to markets and resources in
order to create rents that bind the interests of the ruling coalition together.
Systematic corruption prevents development because it cripples markets.
No matter what advice the International Monetary Fund or the World
Bank gives to developing countries, it won’t work if a country’s government
remains systematically corrupt.3
American history provides an important lesson for modern developing
countries about how to eliminate systematic corruption. Not only did some
American governments exhibit clear evidence of systematic corruption,
but Americans consciously tried to eliminate systematic corruption
through changes in their constitutions. The American lesson, however, is
not just hard to learn, it is hard to understand in the ﬁrst place. This is
largely the result of changes in language. “Corruption” is an anachronism:
it is a word with a meaning two centuries ago that it no longer has today. In
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Americans were ﬁxated
on systematic corruption as the nation’s primary political problem. They
The Concept of Systematic Corruption in American History 25
3. North, Wallis, and Weingast, in “The Natural State,” generalize the idea of systemati-
cally corrupt governments to include a broad class of political economy organizations that
limit economic entry to create rents that are then used to solidify the political systems. Such
“natural states” appear to have been dominant for the last 5,000 years of human history, and
continue to exist in most countries of the world today.feared systematic corruption and worried about venal corruption, but they
indiscriminately used the same word to identify both.
Corruption is not the only word that poses a problem. British common-
wealthmen and the American founders used language about the dangers of
slavery, tyranny, conspiracy, and corruption that seem to us so highly ex-
aggerated that it must have been purely rhetorical, or even propagandistic.
The great contribution of Bernard Bailyn was to demonstrate that Whigs
and American revolutionaries, in fact, believed exactly what they were say-
ing.4 Fears that corruption would lead to tyranny and slavery don’t make
sense to us today—after all, we know how the American Revolution
turned out. But at the end of the eighteenth century, Americans were sur-
rounded by countries ruled by tyrants and populated by citizens who did
not possess a full measure of liberty and self-determination, the eigh-
teenth-century deﬁnition of slavery.5
Paradoxically, British and American citizens believed they lived under
the best system of constitutional government ever devised, one where a
mixed and balanced constitution of government protected individual lib-
erties and freedoms. Americans had a deep and abiding fear that if they
were not vigilant in protecting their liberties today, their governments
would become corrupt and quickly evolve into tyrannies tomorrow. In
other words, they worried about what was going to happen next.
The ﬁnal diﬃculty in understanding how Americans eliminated system-
atic corruption in their government is that they did not get it right on the
ﬁrst try. Every American constitution embodied some form of balanced
government by 1787, but balanced government alone was not enough to
withstand systematic corruption. Americans had more to learn than their
British ancestors taught them. Systematic corruption was an inherently
constitutional problem that required a constitutional solution. In the
1840s, the states ﬁnally understood that mandating open economic entry
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4. “I began to see a new meaning in phrases that I, like most historians, had readily dis-
missed as mere rhetoric and propaganda: ‘slavery,’ ‘corruption,’ ‘conspiracy’....  I  began to
suspect that they meant something very real to both the writers and their readers: that there
were real fears, real anxieties, a sense of real danger behind these phrases, and not merely the
desire to inﬂuence by rhetoric and propaganda the inert minds of an otherwise passive popu-
lace” (Bailyn 1967, p. ix).
5. One of the clearest and most enlightening discussions of what British Whigs and Amer-
icans meant when they said “tyranny and slavery” is Quentin Skinner’s short essay Liberty be-
fore Liberalism. “These writers are no less insistent, however, that a state or nation will be de-
prived of its liberty if it is merely subject or liable to having its actions determined by the will
of anyone other than the representatives of the body politic as a whole. It may be that the com-
munity is not as a matter of fact governed tyrannically; its rulers may choose to follow the dic-
tates of the law, so that the body politic may not in practice be deprived of any of its constitu-
tional rights. Such a state will nevertheless be counted as living in slavery if its capacity for
action is in any way dependent on the will of anyone other than the body of its own citizens”
(Skinner 1998, p. 49).undercut the ability of political factions to create rents and so to manipu-
late the economic system.6
The ﬁrst section of this paper follows the concept of corruption as it de-
veloped in the philosophy of Aristotle, Polybius, Machiavelli, Harrington,
through to the eighteenth-century British Whigs. Subsequent sections are
devoted to Americans during the Revolution, in the 1790s, the 1830s, and
ﬁnally the Progressive Era. The paper’s fundamental conclusion is that the
most basic economic institution in a modern, thriving, developed econ-
omy—unlimited free entry and competition unrestricted by government—
developed as a solution to systematic corruption: a solution to the polit-
ical problem of preventing narrow political groups from obtaining
uncontested control of governments. The real lesson developing countries
can learn from American history is how the United States eliminated sys-
tematic corruption. Eliminating systematic corruption required an eco-
nomic solution to a political problem. Between the 1790s and 1840s, the
United States developed a constitutional structure of state governments
that mandated free economic entry and competition. It took seventy years,
but the round of American state constitutional changes in the 1840s are the
heart of what eliminated systematic corruption. American governments
were so successful at eliminating systematic corruption that we no longer
understand what the term corruption meant in the 1800s, nor do we worry
about systematic corruption in our current political system.
1.1 From Aristotle to the British Whigs
The King’s ministers were not attacked for sitting in Parliament, but
they were attacked for allegedly ﬁlling Parliament with the recipients of
government patronage. For what was universally acknowledged was that
if the members of the legislatures became dependent on patronage, the
legislature would cease to be independent and the balance of the consti-
tution would become corrupt. Corruption on an eighteenth-century
tongue—where it was an exceedingly common term—meant not only
venality, but disturbance of the political conditions necessary to human
virtue and freedom.
—J. G. A. Pocock (1985, p. 78)7
Aristotle was the ﬁrst western philosopher to talk about mixed govern-
ment: “But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms: for the con-
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6. Between 1776 and 1850, the national government wrote two constitutions, and the orig-
inal thirteen states wrote their ﬁrst constitutions and an additional sixteen new constitutions.
For the importance of opening entry as a deterrent to corruption in the 1840s state constitu-
tion see Wallis (2005).
7. Pocock’s work is fundamental for understanding the evolution of ideas about balanced
government and corruption. The argument is completely developed in The Machiavellian Mo-stitution is better which is made up of more numerous elements” (1996,
book III, 1255a 4). Polybius explicitly tied corruption to the idea of consti-
tutional balance and the changing distribution of power within govern-
ments. From then, the nature of both balanced government and corruption
evolved together until, by 1776, corruption became synonymous with a
failure to maintain balance in the constitutional structure of government.
Aristotle deﬁned pure forms of government as those that “govern with a
view to the common interest.” The pure and corrupt forms “are as follows:
—of kingship, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; and of constitutional
government, democracy.” (1996, book III, 1279a 30 and 1279b 4). Aristo-
tle’s task in the Politics was to understand how constitutions aﬀected the
behavior of governments, with the purpose of discerning how good gov-
ernments might be instituted in human society. Constitutions were origi-
nally thought of as literally the body politic, not as written documents or
theoretical constructs.8 All physical bodies exhibit a cycle of growth, ma-
turity, and decay: corruption. Corruption happened to constitutions, just
as certainly as decay and death happened to individuals. The central ques-
tion of political philosophy asked whether a political constitution could
possibly be devised that did not inevitably end in corruption.
Polybius extended Aristotle’s categories of pure and corrupt forms of
government into an explicit cyclical theory of constitutional development:
So then we enumerate six forms of government,—the three commonly
spoken of which I have just mentioned, [the pure forms of kingship, aris-
tocracy, and democracy] and three more allied forms, I mean despotism,
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ment. The intellectual history developed in this and the following sections is based on the
work of Pocock (1972, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1985, 1987), Bailyn, Wood, Skinner (1978a,b), and
many others. This literature is truly remarkable. What no one seems to have seen, however, is
how the concept of corruption developed in western political thought ties economic and po-
litical institutions together so closely and directly. That is the contribution of this paper.
8. We speak of a person with a hearty constitution or with a fragile constitution. Constitu-
tions were like bodies. “Like their contemporaries in England and like their predecessors for
centuries before, the colonists at the beginning of the Revolutionary controversy understood
by the word ‘constitution’ not, as we would have it, a written document or even an unwritten
but deliberately contrived design of government and speciﬁcation of rights beyond the power
of ordinary legislation to alter; they thought of it, rather as the constituted—that is, existing—
arrangement of governmental institutions, laws, and customs together with the principles and
goals that animated them. So John Adams wrote that a political constitution is like ‘the con-
stitution of the human body’; ‘certain contextures of the nerves, ﬁbres, and muscles, or certain
qualities of the blood and juices’ some of which ‘may be properly called stamina vitae, or es-
sentials and fundamentals of the constitution; parts without which life itself cannot be pre-
served a moment” (Bailyn 1967, p. 68, citing Adams Works, III, pp. 478–79).
“By constitution we mean, whenever we speak with propriety and exactness, that assem-
blage of laws, institutions, and customs, derived from certain ﬁxed principles of reason, di-
rected to certain ﬁxed objects of public good, that compose the general system, according to
which the community hath agreed to be governed” (Bolingbroke 1997, p. 88). Bolingbroke
was a leading Tory politician in the early eighteenth century and an articulate proponent of
Commonwealth ideas.oligarchyand mob-rule.The ﬁrst of these arises without artiﬁcial aid and
in the natural order of events. Next to this, and produced from it by the
aid of art and adjustment, comes kingship; which degenerating into the
evil form allied to it, by which I mean tyranny, both are once more de-
stroyed and aristocracy produced. Again the latter being in the course of
nature perverted to oligarchy, and the people passionately avenging the
unjust acts of their rulers, democracy comes into existence; which again
by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer mob-rule. No clearer
proof of the truth of what I say could be obtained than by a careful ob-
servation of the natural origin, genesis, and decadence of these several
forms of government. For it is only by seeing distinctly how each of them
is produced that a distinct view can also be obtained of its growth,
zenith, and decadence, and the time, circumstance, and place in which
each of these may be expected to recur. (Polybius 1962, book 6, 4, p. 460)
Polybius developed a theory of “the regular cycle of constitutional revo-
lutions, in which and the natural order in which constitutions change, are
transformed, and return again to their original stage” (book 6, 10, p. 466).
Any society with governments of the pure forms inevitably cycled from
kingship through tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and mob-
rule. The mob is subdued by the noble and pure king, setting the cycle in
motion again. For Polybius, corruption was the process by which one form
of government evolved into another form. It was a force beyond the indi-
vidual, and so beyond individual moral or ethical behavior. Corruption
was an “undeviating law of nature” in unmixed governments.
Polybius believed that it was possible to prevent corruption by resorting
to mixed and balanced governments that combined elements of all three
pure types, which he saw in the historical example of Lycurgus, who
accordingly combined together all the excellences and distinctive fea-
tures of the best constitutions, that no part should become unduly pre-
dominant, and be perverted into its kindred vice; and that, each power
being checked by the others, no one part should turn the scale or deci-
sively out balance the others; but that, by being accurately adjusted and
in exact equilibrium, the whole might remain long steady like a ship sail-
ing close to the wind. The royal power was prevented from growing in-
solent by fear of the people, which had also assigned to it an adequate
share in the constitution. The people in their turn were restrained from
a bold contempt of the kings by fear of the Gerusia: the members of
which, being selected on grounds of merit, were certain to throw their in-
ﬂuence on the side of justice in every question that arose; and thus the
party placed at a disadvantage by its conservative tendency was always
strengthened and supported by the weight and inﬂuence of the Gerusia.
The result of this combination has been that the Lacedaemonians re-
tained their freedom for the longest period of any people with which we
are acquainted. (book 6, 10, pp. 466–67).
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and the process of political change.9 Anything that disrupted the balance
of the constitution was technically corruption, whether it resulted from
morally corrupt individual behavior or not. Corruption resulted from in-
herent tendencies in the structure of societies.
The very term balance suggests the modern concept of an equilibrium,
but constitutional balance was not thought to be a stable or self-enforcing
equilibrium. Small changes in the relative balance of power between the
groups that made up the political and social order could disrupt the sys-
tem. A balanced constitution could ward oﬀ corruption, but it had to be
maintained by the eternal vigilance of fallible human care and attention.
Maintaining a balance required politicians and philosophers to deﬁne ex-
actly what constituted the balance, that is, to deﬁne exactly what behavior
was unconstitutional or corrupt. This way of thinking produced two im-
portant consequences:
First, articulating the concept of corruption was fundamental to the
evolution of constitutions as fundamental law, captured in a written doc-
ument, and realized in the lives of men and women through custom, prac-
tice, conﬂict, and adjudication. Implementing the idea that societies
should be governed by laws, not men, required that society at large agree
on a way to identify when it was corrupted.
Second, the balanced constitution was a theoretical construct similar to
a unique and universal maximum.10Any movement away from the balance
was a movement toward tyranny and slavery. This was true whether the
movement was toward tyranny of the one, the many, or the few. The bal-
anced constitution was a perfect equipoise from which a slippery slope led
downward in all directions. Any change in the balance was inherently cor-
rupt. Systematic corruption was not about speciﬁc behaviors; it was not
like moral and ethical corruption. It was change that destabilized the po-
litical order.
The conﬂict between the Stuart kings and the British Parliament gener-
ated a wealth of thinking about the nature of political constitutions, in-
cluding Hobbes, Harrington, and Locke. A deﬁning moment in the history
of the English constitution occurred when, on June 21, 1642, shortly before
the Civil War began, two of Charles I’s advisors drafted and persuaded the
king to issue a document, His Majesty’s Answer to the Nineteen Proposi-
tions of Both Houses of Parliament,in which the king declared that England
was a mixed government and not a condescending monarchy. The Answer
was a critical turning point in constitutional history because in it the king
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9. See Machiavelli (1996, book I, pp. 10–23) and Pocock (1973, p. 129; 1975, pp. 83–219).
10. Harrington concluded his “Epistle to the Reader,” which opens Oceana, with a theo-
retical bent: “I dare promise you that if I have not made you a good ﬂight, I have sprung you
the best quarry; for though the discourses be full of crudities, the model hath had perfect con-
coction” (1992, p. 2).admitted that England possessed a balanced government, not an absolute
monarchy. It quickly became part of the English constitutional canon.11
The Answerdid not concede sovereignty to Parliament nor was it a conces-
sion of royal prerogatives. It cemented the constitutionality of the mon-
archy and enshrined the idea of balanced government.
If the Answerguaranteed a balanced constitution, it did very little to in-
dicate exactly how the balance was to be deﬁned, maintained, and al-
lowed to change. During the interregnum, the writings of James Harring-
ton helped deﬁne the constitutional balance and move it from a static to
a dynamic basis. Harrington made two fundamental contributions. First,
he delineated how the distribution of military power in a society was a
function of the distribution of land tenure, and thus how every govern-
ment rested on a particular set of property rights in land. Second, he
showed how the constitutional balance within government must corre-
spond to the balance of military power between social orders implied by
the distribution of land tenure. Harrington’s model contained two bal-
ances, one of government and one of military power. His genius was to see
that these two balances must correspond. A constitutional system that
gave more power to an element of society (king, aristocracy, the people)
than the relevant share of land possessed by that element of the popula-
tion was inevitably unstable. Either the constitution or the underlying
balance of military power must change and, in classic Polybian terms,
Harrington deﬁned corruption as change: “corruption in this sense signi-
ﬁeth no more than that the corruption of one government (as in natural
bodies) is the generation of another . . .” (1992, pp. 60–61). Harrington
saw balanced government as a way to provide political stability and pre-
vent the endless struggles of the one, the few, and the many to control the
government, and the warfare, disruption, and occasional tyranny that en-
sued.
The Answers and Harrington’s Oceana deﬁned a constitutional balance,
but it was not yet in place. Between the restoration of Charles II in 1660
and the installation of William and Mary in 1688, “commonwealthmen”
or “True Whigs” or “Real Whigs” articulated a version of the balanced
constitution and its associated corruptions.12 By 1675, they had developed
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11. The text of the Answer is printed in Weston (1965), along with the Political Catechism,
a popular document that interpreted the Answerin terms that would become a central part of
Whig theory. The Answer is discussed in Pocock (1975, p. 361).
12. This group included Neville, Shaftesbury, Locke, Marvell, and Sidney. These men were
contemporaries of Harrington, who died enfeebled and in poor health in 1677. The promi-
nence of Harrington in this section is a matter of exposition. Harrington ultimately had the
most inﬂuence, but he was only one of several important commonwealth thinkers. See Rob-
bins (1959) for an in-depth treatment of the men and their ideas.
In the nineteenth century a “Whig” party developed, which was not identical with Whig
theorists. Bolingbroke, for example, was a leading Whig thinker and a Tory politician. In the
discussion that follows I use the term commonwealth thinkers or theorists to avoid confusion.a coherent position containing the basic themes of opposition ideology.13
Balanced government required that political actors, in Britain the king,
the Lords, and the Commons, be truly independent of one another. If one
branch of the government gained ascendancy over, or inﬂuence in, another
branch the checks built into the system would be compromised. If, for ex-
ample, the king gained control of the Commons, the Commons could no
longer prevent the king from tyrannizing over the government.
The starting point of the commonwealth critique of the Stuart govern-
ment was the creation of a standing army. This was not because a standing
army was a direct physical threat to liberty. Instead, a professional stand-
ing army threatened the independence of Parliament, by ﬁlling the Com-
mons with professional soldiers and other oﬃceholders who careers and
livelihood depended on the good will and patronage of the executive. “The
standing army appears in this context as an instrument of corruption
rather than of dictatorship. Army oﬃcers in Parliament are placemen, and
they encourage the growth of a military establishment outside parliamen-
tary control . . .” (Pocock 1973, p. 125).14
The critique widened after the new arrangements between King William
and Parliament produced a complementary set of institutional changes in
ﬁscal policy and government administration. They included the Bank of
England, professionalization of tax collection and administration, and the
development of new methods to fund the growing national debt.15 Contin-
uous warfare with France created a military-industrial complex in En-
gland. Between 1700 and 1800 government expenditures rose from 5 per-
cent of income to 20 percent of income.16This unprecedented expansion of
state power was equally the accomplishment of Parliament and the king,
for Parliament controlled tax policy.
It was in the early eighteenth century that the concept of systematic cor-
ruption was articulated fully. Commonwealth theorists drew an explicit
connection between royal manipulation of economic privileges and the se-
curing of political power. The British had come through the civil wars of
the seventeenth century with their belief in a balanced constitution intact
and enhanced. They increasingly saw the House of Lords as a balance be-
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13. I have drawn on Pocock’s “Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies”
in this section (1973, pp. 104–47). The argument is developed further in The Machiavellian
Moment (1975, pp. 406–22).
14. Since the inﬂuential position of the aristocracy depended on their provision of military
service, the country could have an independent nobility or a professional army, but not both.
“For the power of Peerage and a Standing Army are like two buckets, the proportion that one
goes down, the other exactly goes up . . .” From A Letter from a Person of Quality to his Friend
in the Country, as quoted in Pocock (1973, p. 118).
15. On the Bank of England and the ﬁnancial revolution generally see Dickson (1967); on
the bureaucratization of tax collection see Brewer (1989); and for the national debt see North
and Weingast (1989).
16. Mathias and O’Brian (1976) review the history of government revenues and expendi-
tures in eighteenth-century Britain.tween a competing monarchy and the House of Commons.17 Indepen-
dence of the three parts was required to maintain the balance. The com-
monwealthmen saw the economic innovations of the ﬁnancial revolution
as mechanisms by which the crown exerted inﬂuence in the Commons and
subverted parliamentary independence. The king’s tools were parliamen-
tary patronage, the public credit, and political parties. If the king obtained
enough inﬂuence in Parliament to suborn its independence, liberty would
be lost and tyranny and slavery would follow.18
Rising defense expenditures increased the number of patronage positions
in the Army, Navy, Treasury, Customs, and Excise at the disposal of the ex-
ecutive. By the time of the American Revolution, close to half of the House
of Commons were placemen, pensioners, or represented electoral districts
under the control of the king and his ministers.19The steadily growing public
debt created a class of creditors with a direct interest in the ﬁnancial stabil-
ity of the government, many of them members of Parliament. The large
proﬁts to be made in marketing and servicing the debt went to the favored
few ﬁnancial houses, banks, and chartered trading companies, all of whom
had connections in both the executive and Parliament. There was ample rea-
son to doubt the independence of individual members of Parliament. And
ﬁnally, the manipulations of politicians like Walpole created groups within
the government whose interest “is that of men attached to the government;
or to speak more properly, to the persons of those who govern; or, to speak
more properly still, to the power proﬁt, or protection they acquire by the
favour of these persons, but enemies to the constitution” (Bolingbroke 1997,
p. 85). The creation of a political party within Parliament that was headed
by the king, organized by his ministers, ﬁnanced by corporate privileges, and
coordinated by the national debt, threatened the end of balanced govern-
ment and the establishment of a unitary executive tyranny.20
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17. This is the theme of Weston (1965).
18. “It is certain then, that if ever such men as call themselves friends of the government,
but are real enemies of the constitution, prevail, they will make it a capital point of their
wicked policy to keep up a standing army....  T o  d e s t r o y  British liberty with an army of
Britons, is not a measure so sure of success as some people may believe. To corrupt the Par-
liament is a slower, but might prove a more eﬀectual method; and two or three hundred mer-
cenaries in the two Houses, if they could be listed there, would be more fatal to the constitu-
tion, than ten times as many thousands in red and in blue out of them. Parliaments are the
true guardians of liberty. For this principally they were instituted; and this is the principal ar-
ticle of that great and noble trust, which the collective body of the people of Britain reposes
in the representative. But then no slavery can be so eﬀectually brought and ﬁxed upon us as
parliamentary slavery. By the corruption of Parliament, and the absolute inﬂuence of a King,
or his minister, on the two Houses, we return to that state, and are really governed by the ar-
bitrary rule of one man” (Bolingbroke 1997, pp. 92, 93–94).
19. See the essays on “Parliamentary Patronage,” pp. 46–56, and on “Placemen and Pen-
sioners,” pp. 118–26 in Namier and Brooke (1964).
20. The commonwealthmen opposed all political parties as a manifestation of corruption.
To confuse matters, at the same time one of the parties that developed in Britain was the Whig
Party, which is distinct from the Whig/Commonwealth thinkers. Bolingbroke, as noted, was
a prominent Tory politician as well as a prominent Whig philosopher.The British in the eighteenth century certainly enjoyed better govern-
ment than they, and perhaps the world, had ever seen. Britons on both
sides of the Atlantic extolled the virtues of the British constitution. John To-
land called the British government “the most free and best constituted in
the world.” John Adams claimed, “no Government that ever existed was so
essentially free.” Even the Frenchman Montesquieu talked of “this beau-
tiful system.”21 The Whigs believed in the perfect balance of the British
constitution. In this light, it is easy to dismiss commonwealth claims of
corruption as paranoia. To do so, however, overlooks that Whigs were not
concerned about the current state of Britain. Commonwealthmen feared
what would happen next. They had no historical yardstick to judge whether
the changes that British society and government were undergoing in the
eighteenth century were good or bad. Commonwealthmen believed, with
the deepest conviction, that if executive inﬂuence in Parliament was al-
lowed to go unchecked, then the next stage in British government would in-
evitably be tyranny and slavery.
The heart of the commonwealth attack on corruption criticized the
government’s relation to the economy. Adam Smith attacked the system
ofgovernment-granted mercantilist privileges (Smith 1981). In Cato’s Let-
ters, Trenchard and Gordon (1995) challenged the use of chartered corpo-
rations to promote economic activity that potentially created economic
rents (by limiting entry) that could be used by the Crown to cement eco-
nomic interests to its cause (no. 3, 1720, 44–45).22 “For as to that class of
ravens, whose wealth has cost the nation its all, as they are manifest ene-
mies to God and man, no man can call them his neighbours: They are
rogues of prey, they are stock-jobbers, they are a conspiracy of stock-
jobbers!”23 The ﬁnancial revolution brought with it numerous instances of
special privileges granted by the government.24 The combined charges of
systematic corruption, suborning the independence of politicians and Par-
liament, and individual corruption, including the venality and greed of
stock-jobbers and speculators, packed a powerful message.
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21. Quotations from Wood (1969, p. 11).
22. “Companies and joint-stocks are always established for the encouragement and bene-
ﬁt of trade; though they always happen to mar and cramp trade” (Trenchard and Gordon
[1720] 1995, Cato’s Letters, no. 9, p. 69).
23. The title of Letter no. 6, December 10, 1720, conveys the sentiments of Trenchard and
Gordon: How easily the People are bubbled by Deceivers. Further Caution against deceitful
Remedies for the publick suﬀerings from the wicked Execution of the South-Sea Scheme.
24. As Dickson summarized: “Finally, it is worth noting that while few aspects of the Fi-
nancial Revolution were of greater political and economic utility than the development of a
market in securities in London, none united contemporary opinion more against it. It was de-
nounced as inherently wicked and against the public interest. The phrase ‘stock-jobbing’,
freely used to denote every kind of activity in the market, had clear overtones of self-interest
and corruption. An anthology of comments by contemporaries would be remarkably uni-
form, indeed monotonous, in its tone, and uninformative about how the market actually
worked” (1967, pp. 32–33).By the mid-eighteenth century commonwealthmen decried the corrupt-
ing evils of executive patronage, the public credit, and political parties.
Commonwealth ideals were important elements of the political conversa-
tion in the eighteenth century. They deﬁned, with clear, bright lines, what
was and was not constitutional. Britain, of course, was in the midst of a
phenomenal rise to world power, and most Britons were happily apathetic
about the supposed corruption of their government. In Briton, the com-
monwealthmen “were not in any sense of the word an organized opposi-
tion....  W ithout leaders and organization the reformers failed. When
they achieved these they still failed to attract suﬃcient public support and
interest. A part of their failure must be attributed to their detestation of
party....  T h e  R e a l  W higs were not a coherent party. They professed al-
most as many creeds in politics as in religion.” Yet “In America the aca-
demic ideas of the Whigs of the British Isles were fruitful and found prac-
tical expression.”25
1.2 Corruption, Revolution, and Constitutions
Sir, we have done everything that could be done to avert the storm which
is now coming on. We have petitioned; we have remonstrated; we have
supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have
implored its interposition to attest the tyrannical hands of the ministry
and Parliament.
The battle, sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the ac-
tive, the brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough
to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no re-
treat but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged. Their clank-
ing may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable—and let
it come!
—Patrick Henry, Address to the Virginia Provincial Convention, March
23, 1775
The notion of a legislative power exercised conjointly by kings, lords
and commons is a notion of legislative sovereignty undeveloped in clas-
sical republican theory; its presence in the Answer is a reminder that the
notion of “separation of powers,” though invented largely in England,
could not be eﬀective there and could be realized in the United States
only after rejection of parliamentary government.
—J. G. A. Pocock (1987, p. 310)
We have reached the point where British and American paths divide.
The “republican synthesis” in American history provides a convincing ex-
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25. Robbins (1959) quotes from pages 381, 382, and 385.planation for why Americans revolted and what “made their revolution so
unusual, for they revolted not against the English constitution but on be-
half of it” (Wood 1969, p. 10).26 The desire to preserve the existing consti-
tution made the American revolution one motivated by fear rather than
hope. The widespread perception of English corruption, on both sides of
the Atlantic, inexorably drove the Americans to independence once a
wedge opened between Parliament and the colonies in 1763. The fear in the
American colonies was that England, “once the land of liberty—the
school of patriots—the nurse of heroes, has become the land of slavery—
the school of parricides and the nurse of tyrants.”27 At its root, the fear
driving the American Revolution was Polybian. The inﬂuence of the exec-
utive in Parliament had unbalanced the constitution. What inevitably fol-
lowed monarchy, no matter how pure the intentions of those who produced
the monarchy, was tyranny. As Patrick Henry declared: “Our chains are
forged. Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston!”
Any government organized along commonwealth lines should immedi-
ately have put in place a constitution with balanced government. In May
of 1776, the Continental Congress asked the states to write their own con-
stitutions. By July 3, New Jersey had drafted a new constitution which,
among its many features, distinctly articulated the separation of powers:
XX. That the legislative department of this government may, as much as
possible, be, preserved from all suspicion of corruption, none of the
Judges of the Supreme or other Courts, Sheriﬀs, or any other person or
persons possessed of any post of proﬁt under the government, other than
Justices of the Peace, shall be entitled to a seat in the Assembly: but that,
on his being elected, and taking his seat, his oﬃce or post shall be con-
sidered as vacant.28
The Constitution of Maryland, ratiﬁed in November 1776, stipulated in
Section 6 of the Declaration of Rights: “That the legislative, executive and
judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct
from each other.” Separation of powers was the most visible way that
Americans addressed systematic political corruption, but the entire struc-
ture of early state constitutions, with their articulated branches, attempted
to systematize balanced government.
The powers assumed by the states in their constitutions were not powers
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26. Wood (1969, p. 10). The republican synthesis literature is neatly summarized and dis-
cussed in Shalhope (1972, 1982).
27. The quotation is from a letter from Charles Lee to Robert Morris, January 3, 1776, as
quoted by Wood (1969, p. 32).
28. New Jersey, Constitution of 1776, Article 20. The New Jersey Constitution of 1844, Ar-
ticle 3, Section 1, read: “1. The powers of the government shall be divided into three distinct
departments—the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or persons belonging to,
or constituting one of these departments, shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging
to either of the others, except as herein expressly provided” (Wallis, NBER/Maryland State
Constitution Project).necessarily denied to the national government. But once states deﬁned
their powers they could not be taken by the national government without
substantial political cost. The second national constitution, written in
1787, gave the national government broad and generous powers. But only
in the areas of military and international aﬀairs, public lands, international
trade and commercial policy, and (to a lesser and immediately disputed ex-
tent) ﬁnancial and monetary policy, did the national government possess
well-deﬁned exclusive powers. Even in these areas, with the exception of
military defense and international relations, the national government sub-
sequently found it extremely diﬃcult for political reasons to exercise its
constitutional powers.29 National government action inevitably raised the
specter of systematic corruption.
The ability of states to legislate, regulate, or promote almost any aspect
of economic and social behavior meant that the states, and not the national
government, became the focal point of economic policies. Americans were
embarking on two new experiments in government: written constitutions
and widespread government support of private organizations. The ﬁrst ex-
periment is a central part of American history. The second experiment,
successful as it was, is so taken for granted that we rarely recognize how im-
portant government support of private organizations was for American
social and economic development. As de Tocqueville famously noted:
“Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of dispositions are
forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial
associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand diﬀerent
types—religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, im-
mensely large and very minutes....  I n  e v ery case, at the head of any new
undertaking, where in France you would ﬁnd the government or in En-
gland some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to ﬁnd an
association” (1966, p. 513).
The American colonists brought the ancient English constitution with
them, but not a king or an aristocracy, two of the critical elements in the
constitutional balance. This led to a more egalitarian society, a deep belief
in the right of individuals to assemble, and more vigorous private sector or-
ganizations. In Europe, the right to form voluntary organizations was not
universal; one found governments and territorial magnates at the head of
organizations because they possessed the sometimes implicit, but often ex-
plicit, privilege to form organizations. The ability to form corporations was
limited to the social and economic elite. Limited entry created the eco-
nomic rents that made royal grants of privilege to the monied interests so
valuable. In America, the freedom to assemble, the ability to form reli-
gious, political, economic, and social organizations did not go undisputed
after the revolution. Deciding how much public support should be given to
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29. This point is developed further in Wallis (2005b) and Wallis and Weingast (2005).private organizations was important and, at least in the economic and po-
litical world, very contentious.
America’s balanced state constitutions recognized the Harringtonian
imperative of balancing power within the government in the same pro-
portion as land ownership was balanced in the population. “Power results
from the real property of society.”30 The equality of land ownership posed
new and vexing problems for American politicians, problems without En-
glish antecedents. The distribution of land did not mirror the distribution
of social prestige or the presumed distribution of leadership talents within
the “natural elite.” Freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom
of petition were fundamental rights. How far did these rights extend into
the politically competent, independent, landowning citizenry? Who had
the right to vote, to incorporate a business, or form a political party?
Britain’s ﬁnancial revolution did not represent a move toward an economy
or society with more open entry; it restricted entry. Adam Smith and the
classical economists built their criticism of government policy on mer-
cantilist limitations on access to economic organization. Kings and min-
isters used limited access to create economic rents, then used the spoils
from the rents to purchase political inﬂuence, and thus eroded the inde-
pendence of Parliament and corrupted the entire political system. Corpo-
rations and stock-jobbers represented the very essence of both systematic
and venal corruption. How was the United States to deal with the identi-
cal problem?
1.3 Corruption and the First Crisis of National Politics
“It is hard to imagine how by deliberate intent, Alexander Hamilton’s
economic program for the new republic could have been better calcu-
lated to exacerbate these [commonwealth] fears....  T hey inevitably
brought to mind the entire system of eighteenth-century English gov-
ernmental ﬁnance, with all the consequences that entailed for minds
shaped by British opposition thought.”
—Banning (1978, p. 128)
Straightening out the nation’s ﬁnances instigated the ﬁrst battle over
corruption in the new republic. Hamilton’s proposed ﬁnancial policies—
refunding national and state debts, a national bank, a moderate revenue
tariﬀ, and excise taxes—all stimulated opposition and debate when Con-
gress considered them in the ﬁrst Congress, which ended in March of 1791.
Each of Hamilton’s measures raised fears of corruption in classic com-
monwealth terms, but all of them passed. The debate over the meaning of
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30. Joseph Galloway to the Continental Congress, as quoted by Jensen (1940, p. 66), quot-
ing John Adam’s Notes on Debates, Works of John Adams, 2:372.the new ﬁnancial system in the summer of 1791, however, produced a con-
ﬂagration of fears about systematic corruption, and led to the creation of
an opposition party in the United States. All of the policy measures at is-
sue were economic, and the critical element in the debate was the eﬀect of
the economic policies on politics.
We have already seen how the ﬁnancial revolution in England created a
funded national debt, a bureaucracy of excise and tariﬀ collectors, a na-
tional bank, and an interlocking set of ﬁnancial intermediaries and char-
tered corporations that marketed and traded in government debt. As the
bureaucracy expanded, so did opportunities for executive patronage. The
ability to tie the interests of the ﬁnancial community to the policies of the
government through the medium of the national debt and corporate char-
ters allowed the Crown to extend its inﬂuence and undermine the inde-
pendence of Parliament. The danger of the English system of ﬁnance was
to fundamental liberties; it was systematic corruption, and the identiﬁca-
tion of ﬁnancial interests with the Crown was the mechanism of corrup-
tion.
Hamilton’s arguments for America’s new ﬁnancial system had ominous
overtones. In the Report on the Public Credit in January 1790, Hamilton
proposed that “If all the public creditors receive their dues from one source
...   their interests will be the same. And having the same interests, they will
unite in support of the ﬁscal arrangements of the government.”31Hamilton
proposed precisely the type of arrangement with the monied interest that
commonwealthmen feared in Britain. A typical response to Hamilton’s
proposals came from the Virginia legislature’s memorial to Congress on
December 16, 1790:
That it is with great concern they ﬁnd themselves compelled, from a
sense of duty, to call the attention of Congress to an act of their last ses-
sion, entitled “An act making provision for the debt of the United
States,” which the General Assembly conceives neither policy, justice,
nor the constitution, warrants. Republican policy, in the opinion of your
memorialists, could scarcely have suggested those clauses in the afore-
said act, which limit the right of the United States, in their redemption
of the public debt. On the contrary, they discern a striking resemblance
between this system and that which was introduced into England at the
Revolution—a system which has perpetuated upon that nation an enor-
mous debt, and has, moreover, insinuated into the hands of the Execu-
tive an unbounded inﬂuence, which, pervading every branch of the Gov-
ernment, bears down all opposition, and daily threatens the destruction
of every thing that appertains to English liberty. The same causes pro-
duce the same eﬀects.
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31. “Report on the Public Credit” American State Papers, Finance, vol. I, p. 15. See Fergu-
son (1961) for an analysis of how constitutional issues and the public debt interacted in
Hamilton’s thinking.In an agricultural country like this, therefore, to erect and concentrate
and perpetuate a large moneyed interest, is a measure which your memo-
rialists apprehend must, in the course of human events, produce one or
other of two evils: the prostration of agriculture at the feet of commerce,
or a change in the present form of Federal Government, fatal to the
existence of American liberty. (American State Papers, Finance, vol. I,
p. 90)
The Virginians questioned whether “Republican policy,” that is, common-
wealth ideas, could have suggested such a ﬁnancial program and drew a di-
rect connection between Hamilton’s plan and English executive corrup-
tion, which has “insinuated into the hands of the Executive an unbounded
inﬂuence.” In typical commonwealth style, the memorial raises the alarm
that Hamilton’s plans threaten the “existence of American liberty.”
As Banning noted (1978), it would have been diﬃcult to consciously de-
sign a ﬁnancial program that provoked commonwealth fears of executive
inﬂuence more directly than Hamilton’s. The debate about the implications
of the ﬁnancial plan after it was passed in 1791 opened a division within
the national government.32 On the Federalist side the Adamses, joined by
Hamilton, praised the British constitution and argued against extending
democracy too far. On what would become the Republican side, Jeﬀerson
and Madison, abetted by Thomas Paine and Phillip Freneau, attacked the
Adamses as monarchists and Hamilton as an aspiring Prime Minister. The
Republicans castigated the ﬁnancial plan as an attempt by Hamilton to use
his position as Treasury Secretary to secure control of the government
through systematic corruption. Public acrimony between the participants
set in motion the formation of distinct Federalist and Republican parties
in national politics. The way in which the conﬂict was resolved placed cor-
ruption in governmental promotion of economic development at the cen-
ter of American politics for the next seventy years. It took a long time for
Americans to ﬁgure out how to write their constitutions. The conﬂict of the
1790s brought to prominence several contradictions in the American ex-
periment with republican government.
Popular sovereignty versus tyranny of the majority. In the ratiﬁcation de-
bates, both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists argued for popular
sovereignty as a critical element in the new American system. Sovereignty,
lodged with the people, could be delegated to representatives through elec-
tion. Yet ultimately sovereignty remained in the hands of the voters. But to
those steeped in commonwealth theory, tyranny of the many was just as
much of a threat as tyranny of the one or the few. The exercise of popular
sovereignty necessarily involved the risk of tyranny of the majority, a risk
that Madison and Hamilton both appreciated. Madison hoped the ex-
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32. The events of 1791 and their subsequent impact on national politics are described in
Banning, (1978) and McCoy (1980).tended republic would mitigate the risk, as he argued famously in Federal-
ist #10. The greatest danger from majority rule lay in the possibility that a
demagogue would arise, unify a majority of the voters behind him, and
lead the government into despotism. Such a leader might override the
checks and balances built into system by sweeping a majority through all
the branches of government. Madison’s hopes didn’t last a decade: by the
early 1790s the Federalists controlled all three branches of the national
government.33
Political parties versus corruption. The Constitution itself oﬀered a way
for Jeﬀerson and Madison to oppose the Federalists: the formation of an
opposition party. The logic of the winner-take-all electoral process for
President, as well as other oﬃces, seemed to guarantee that two competing
parties would eventually emerge.34 Despite the strict separation of execu-
tive and legislative functions in the Constitution, the President and Con-
gress still had to ﬁnd a way to come to an agreement about how govern-
ment was to be carried out, a coordination eventually accomplished
through political parties. But the formation of an overt opposition party
carried with it an explicit danger. The incumbent Federalists, with Wash-
ington at their head, could plausibly claim that their administration was
nonpartisan. Parties and factions were inherently and systematically cor-
rupt. For the Republicans to contest for control of the government as an
organized party exposed them to the charge of per se corruption in the
1790s.35
Rather than stressing the need for competing parties, Madison and the
Republicans emphasized the need for one government with the right poli-
cies. They claimed that they stood on the side of the angels in a debate over
republican versus monarchical government and pure versus corrupt meth-
ods of governing.36 Tarring Adams and the Federalists with being closet
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33. “The success of the Federalist Party in gaining control of all three branches of the na-
tional government called into question the fundamental premise of the Madisonian federal-
ism of 1787–8: that durable factious majorities would be far less likely to coalesce at the na-
tional level of politics” (Ferejohn, Rakove, and Riley 2001, p. 3).
34. “Yet even amid the presumed ‘paranoia’ of the 1790s, with insidious motives being as-
cribed all around, both Federalists and Republicans opted to seek advantage not through a
strategy of exit but rather by exploiting potential opportunities within the Constitution itself.
Both parties quickly discovered a strong incentive to convert the untested mechanism of pres-
idential election into an occasion for political innovation. In 1787 no one had expected the
presidency to emerge as the crucial focus for national political competition, but by 1796, and
even more so by 1800, it was evident that control of the executive was essential to control of
the government” (Ferejohn, Rakove, and Riley 2001, p. 7).
35. In particular see Hofstadter (1969, pp. 80–86) and the third chapter, “The Jeﬀersoni-
ans in Opposition.” Madison, in a series of articles published in the National Gazette, at-
tempted to provide an intellectual justiﬁcation for parties. He drew on the classic distinction
between the few and the many, arguing that the Republicans represented the many.
36. “A ﬁnal aspect of these essays is worth remark, since it represents a strain in Republi-
can thought which we encounter again and again: it is the eﬀort to reduce the issue between
the two sides to a dispute over the merits of republican government. Today this seems a false
question; the issues of funding, assumption, the bank, taxation, and foreign policy seem realmonarchists played well to some voters, but it was the fear of executive in-
ﬂuence in the legislature, wielded by Prime Minister Hamilton through the
coordinating mechanism of the Bank of the United States and the national
debt that posed the greatest threat. It was a threat that resonated with a
century of British political writing and decades of American paranoia over
corruption in the Britain. The negative political implications of the Re-
publicans’ existence as an organized political party were minimized by
stressing the rightness of their cause. “The situation of the public good, in
the hands of two parties nearly poised as to numbers, must be extremely
perilous. Truth is a thing, not of divisibility into conﬂicting parts, but of
unity. Hence both sides cannot be right. Every patriot deprecates a dis-
union, which is only to be obviated by a national preference for one of these
parties.”37 If the Republicans were truly right, then their cause was not a
partisan one but a righteous one, and when the country came to see the wis-
dom of their position there would no longer be a need for competing par-
ties.
Corruption versus promotion of economic development. By building their
case against Hamilton and the Federalists along traditional common-
wealth lines, the Republicans gained the moral force of a century of British
and American thinking about corruption in government. At the same time,
they boxed themselves into a fundamental dilemma. The Republicans were
just as pro-growth and development as the Federalists. Their arguments
against the Federalists were political, not economic. They were not argu-
ing that Hamilton’s plan wouldn’t work in economic terms, but that Hamil-
ton was taking the ﬁrst step down the slippery slope to executive tyranny.
How then did the Republicans propose to promote economic develop-
ment?
The only model available at the end of the eighteenth century was one
that had been used by European governments to promote economic devel-
opment for centuries: by creating public service corporations. Those cor-
porations were given public privileges in order to induce them to provide
public services. Their public privileges generated private rents by limiting
entry. Drew McCoy’s book, Elusive Republic, makes abundantly clear that
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and substantial enough without superimposing on them an artiﬁcial quarrel over a question
of monarchy and hereditary power which all but the tiniest handful of Americans agreed. But
the exaggerated passions of both sides can be understood if we remember that most politically
conscious Americans were acutely aware of being involved in a political experiment in re-
publicanism that was attended by diﬃculties of the most acute kind and that might face many
hidden and unpredictable pitfalls. Both sides were nervous about the stability of republican-
ism in an extensive federal union pervaded by many diﬀerences of sensibility and interest”
(Hofstadter 1969, pp. 34–50). In this passage Hofstadter articulates the notion than any
movement away from the perfect balance is a move down a slippery slope “back towards
monarchy and the hereditary principle.” My only qualiﬁcation to Hofstadter is his overem-
phasis on the fear of monarchy relative to the fears of systematic corruption represented by
the funding system.
37. John Taylor, A Deﬁnition of Parties (1794, p. 2); cited in Hofstadter (1968, p. 100).the central tenets of Jeﬀerson’s and Madison’s economic vision required
the construction of a ﬁnancial and transportation infrastructure to bring
the agrarian west into viable production. At the same time, foreign eco-
nomic policy had to ensure growing external markets for American prod-
ucts abroad, so that yeomen farmers did not produce themselves into
poverty.38 There was no institutional vehicle to promote ﬁnancial and
transportation improvements but the corporation. If the Republicans con-
demned the corporation as an instrument of corruption at the national
level, they left themselves without a way of promoting the very economic
development that they sought and that voters demanded.
None of these contradictions were resolved in the ﬁrst forty years of the
country’s history—all three were resolved in the 1830s and 1840s.
1.4 Corruption Everywhere: Jacksonian Democracy 
and the Whig Response
The Republicans’ ability to govern by apparent consensus from 1800 to
1824 papered over the threat of a tyrannous majority by governing as a vir-
tuous majority. Geographic, if not partisan, divisions soon appeared in
Congress. The inability of the federal government to overcome the prob-
lem of internal geographic competition produced inaction at the federal
level.39 Responsibility for promoting development fell squarely on the
states. The resurgence of national party politics in the 1820s and 1830s was
a result of the ﬁght between the Democrats and Whigs over economic is-
sues and, fundamentally, over systematic corruption. Again, the national
government failed to provide active leadership and, in the 1840s, it was
state governments that ﬁnally solved the paradox of promoting economic
development while avoiding systematic corruption.
State governments expanded their involvement in banking and trans-
portation from 1790 onward.40 It is tempting to attribute the rise of state
promotion to an absence of federal promotion, but it seems clear that state
activity was a continuation of the development of government capacity at
the state level that began in 1776, with the call for new state constitutions.
States began chartering banks, turnpike companies, bridge companies, ﬁre
companies, and all manner of religious, charitable, educational, and mu-
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38. In particular see McCoy (1980) chapter 3, “Commerce and the Independent Repub-
lic,” pp. 76–104. The opening chapters to McCoy lay out the Whig origins of Republican
thought as clearly as Banning (1978). The essential role of corruption in McCoy’s analysis is
captured in the title to Chapter One: “Social Progress and Decay in Eighteenth Century
Thought.”
39. Wallis and Weingast (2005) investigate the causes of federal inaction.
40. The history of government promotion of transportation improvements, federal, state,
and local, is Goodrich (1950, 1960). Larson (2001) supplements Goodrich’s study of the pol-
itics of federal internal improvements. The history of banking is enormous. State banking is
the subject of two recent books by Bodenhorn (2000, 2003).nicipal corporations in the 1790s.41 By 1836, when the national charter for
the Second Bank of the United States expired, there were over 600 state-
chartered banks. In the meantime, the federal government had chartered
the First and Second Banks of the United States and a few small banks in
the District of Columbia.42 Between 1790 and 1860, state and local gov-
ernments spent $450 million, ﬁnancing the Erie Canal, the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad, and hundreds of other successful projects—as well as hun-
dreds of failures. Over the same period, the federal government spent $60
million on transportation improvements, mostly small rivers and harbor
projects. In 1841, aggregate state debts stood at $198 million, larger than
the national debt had ever been.
Corporate charters were, of course, grants of special privileges to small
groups of citizens. Initially, every charter required an act of the state legis-
lature, and all corporations were, in the language of the time, special. Char-
ters always raised the specter of corruption, and strong anticharter senti-
ments were usually expressed whenever a charter was contemplated (Lar-
son2001, p. 119). At the same time, there was widespread public sentiment
for promoting economic development, and the corporation was seen 
as the vehicle for state promotion. As a result, corporate chartering policy
often contained contradictory elements.
Although anticharter arguments were frequently stated as if they ap-
plied to all corporations without exception, in practice opposition usu-
ally settled on some corporations only. Even the Pennsylvania legislators
who campaigned against the BNA and the reincorporation of Philadel-
phia [the city] apparently raised no objections to the charters granted
“every day,” as one legislator put it in 1786, to “half a dozen or 20 people
for some purpose or another.” Similarly, in 1792 James Sullivan carefully
distinguished the incorporation of a bank from that “to build a bridge,
or to cut a canal,” which he found unobjectionable. Banks were probably
assailed more often than any other kind of corporation. But consider the
position of a delegate to the Massachusetts constitutional convention of
1853 who launched a rhetorically powerful attack on corporations “of a
business character.” Among corporations “for other purposes,” which
were apparently exempted from his criticisms, he included railroads, in-
surance companies and banks!” (Maier 1992, pp. 73–74)
The right to assemble, the right to organize, was explicitly recognized by
early American states. Their charter policies reﬂected public support of
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41. In the decade of the 1800s, New York averaged eighteen incorporations per year, Ohio
one, Maryland two, Pennsylvania six, and New Jersey, four. In the 1830s, New York averaged
ﬁfty-seven, Ohio forty-three, Maryland eighteen, Pennsylvania thirty-eight, and New Jersey
eighteen (Evans 1948). There is a substantial historical and legal literature on American cor-
porations: Davis (1961), Dodd (1954), Hurst (1970), Handlin and Handlin (1969), Seavoy
(1982), Maier (1992, 1993), Lamoreaux (2004), and Dunlavy (2004).
42. For state involvement in banking in the early nineteenth century see Wallis, Sylla, and
Legler (1994); Sylla, Legler, and Wallis (1987); and Bodenhorn (2000, 2003).private organization. In itself, this made a signiﬁcant, if unmeasured, con-
tribution to the development of the American economy.43
But granting corporate charters was not without its costs, real and po-
tential. In New York the Albany Regency, headed by Martin Van Buren,
used bank charters to dominate statepolitics.44The Regency granted bank
charters only to their political allies. In return, the bankers provided ﬁnan-
cial support to the Regency, enabling the Regency to maintain control of
state government. It was a classic case of systematic corruption: a group of
politicians using economic privileges to secure their control of the political
system. New York was not unique. Unlike New York, however, most states
that created rents by limiting entry chose to take their share of the rents in
the form of tax revenues, not political inﬂuence.45
The presidential election of 1824 oﬀered a chance to change the course
of federal policy. The election was contested by William Crawford, John
Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and Andrew Jackson. Corruption was the
theme of Jackson’s campaign:
Look to the city of Washington, and let the virtuous patriots of the coun-
try weep at the spectacle. There corruption is springing into existence,
and fast ﬂourishing, Gentlemen, candidates for ﬁrst oﬃce in the gift of
a free people, are found electioneering and intriguing, to worm them-
selves into the conﬁdence of members of congress, who support their
particular favorites, are bye and bye to go forth and dictate to the people
what is right.46
Jackson won a plurality of the popular vote and the electoral vote. When
the election went to the House, however, Clay threw his support behind
Adams. Adams was elected, and subsequently appointed Clay Secretary of
State. Jackson decried the “corrupt bargain”: “so you see, the Judas of the
West [Clay] has closed the contract and will receive thirty pieces of silver.
His end will be the same. Was there ever witnessed such a bare faced cor-
ruption in any country before?”47 Jackson’s campaign for the 1828 election
began in 1824, and its theme was corruption.
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Massachusetts was used to support private organizations.
44. See Bodenhorn, this volume, Seavoy (1982), and Benson (1961) for the political uses of
bank chartering in New York.
45. Wallis, Sylla, and Legler (1994) present a simple model of “ﬁscal interest” that explains
why some states chose to limit entry into banking in return for higher dividends on the bank
stock they owned. Pennsylvania consciously limited entry into banking. New Jersey created
a monopoly railroad, the Camden and Amboy, from which the state received substantial div-
idends (Cadman 1949). In Arkansas, two politically powerful families used a state bank for
the same purposes as the Albany Regency (Worley 1950).
46. Eaton (1824, pp. 3–4) as quoted in Larson (2001, p. 154). The quote is from Letters of
Wyoming, campaign pamphlets that began appearing in 1823, written by John Eaton, later
Jackson’s Secretary of War. “Eaton was constructing for Jackson out of older republican cloth
a coat of virtue and simplicity that made other candidates appear to be draped in ancient,
British-style corruption” (Larson 2001, p. 155).
47. Jackson to Lewis, February 20, 1825; as quoted in Remini (1967, p. 98).Jackson’s election in 1828 brought the three contradictions of American
democracy into clear focus—tyranny of the majority, political parties, and
the connection between economic development and systematic corrup-
tion. General Jackson was the military hero who, to his enemies, oﬀered the
perfect image of a demagogue and the dark side of democracy. The Demo-
cratic party built to elect Jackson did not disappear after 1828; competitive
party politics became a permanent part of American politics and raised the
specter of corruption, faction, and party. Finally, the opposition party that
emerged during Jackson’s ﬁrst term, what became the Whig party headed
by Henry Clay, chose to contest Jackson in the arena of economic policy.
The ﬁrst deﬁning question for Whigs and Democrats was whether the na-
tional government should renew the charter of the Second Bank of the
United States. The question boiled down to whether a national bank was
an instrument of systematic corruption.
The economic and political history of the Bank War is well known.48The
debate between Jackson and his opponents was carried out in terms of
systematic corruption. Jackson’s veto message railed against the special
privileges conveyed to the Bank, laid out Jackson’s position on the battle
between the aristocratic wealthy and the masses of the population, and
articulated the abuse of privilege as an evil of government.49 But he did not
begin speaking of systematic corruption until the Bank War broke into
open conﬂict with his plans to remove the federal deposits. On September
18, 1833, Jackson had Secretary Taney read a statement to the Cabinet that
Jackson and Taney had prepared on why the deposits should be removed:
The Bank of the United States is in itself a Government which has grad-
ually increased its strength from the day of its establishment. The ques-
tion between it and the people has become one of power—a question
which its adherents do not scruple to avow must ultimately be decided in
favor of the Bank....  T h e  mass of people have more to fear from com-
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48. See Remini (1967) and Temin (1969). The debate in economic history over the eﬀects
of the Bank War, Jackson’s other economic policies, and the causes of the macroeconomic
rages on. For a summary of the literature, and a strong argument that Jackson’s domestic eco-
nomic policies contributed to the Panic of 1837, see Rousseau (2002).
49. “It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government
to their selﬁsh purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government
...   b ut when the laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artiﬁcial distinc-
tions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent
more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who
have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to com-
plain of the injustice of their government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils
exist only in its abuses.
If we can not at once, in justice to interest vested under improvident legislation, make our
government what it ought to be, we can at least take a stand against all new grants of mo-
nopolies exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our Government to the advance-
ment of the few at the expense of the many, and in favor of compromise and gradual reform in
our code of laws and system of political economy.” Jackson’s Veto Message, July 10, 1832
(Richardson 1897, pp. 1153–54).binations of the wealthy and professional classes—from an aristocracy
which thro’ the inﬂuence of riches and talents, insidiously employed,
sometimes succeeds in preventing political institutions, however well ad-
justed, from securing the freedom of the citizen, and in establishing the
most odious and oppressive government under the forms of a free insti-
tution.50
Jackson recalled the classic phrases of systematic corruption. The Bank it-
self was a government: a small group (in this case Biddle and Clay) were us-
ing the powers of government to create a powerful economic interest, and
gains from monopoly rents thus created were being used to subvert the pro-
cess of government and threaten the liberties of all citizens by establishing
an odious and oppressive government.
His opponents replied in kind. In the election of 1832, they styled them-
selves National Republicans, and by late 1833 the Whig party was born. In
a speech in December 1833 protesting Jackson’s removal of federal de-
posits, Henry Clay concluded:
The eyes and the hopes of the American people are anxiously turned to
Congress. They feel that they have been deceived and insulted; their con-
ﬁdence abused; their interests betrayed; and their liberties in danger.
They see a rapid and alarming concentration of all power in one man’s
hands. They see that, by the exercise of the positive authority of the Ex-
ecutive, and his negative power exerted over Congress, the will of one
man alone prevails, and governs the republic. The question is no longer
what laws will Congress pass, but what will the Executive not veto? The
President, and not Congress, is addressed for legislative action....  W e
behold the usual incidents of approaching tyranny. The land is ﬁlled with
spies and informers, and detraction and denunciation are the orders of
the day. People, especially oﬃcial incumbents in this place, no longer
dare speak in the fearless tones of manly freemen, but in the cautious
whispers of trembling slaves. The premonitory symptoms of despotism
are upon us; and if Congress do not apply an instantaneous and eﬀective
remedy, the fatal collapse will soon come on, and we shall die—ignobly
die—base, mean, and abject slaves; the scorn and contempt of mankind;
unpitied, unwept, unmourned!51
Clay did not accuse Jackson of venal corruption. Clay and the Whigs
charged Jackson with executive usurpation, of systematically corrupting
the political process. Following commonwealth theory, tyranny and slav-
ery would inevitably follow.
During the early 1830s, when permanent two-party political competi-
tion developed, both parties accused the other of systematic corruption. It
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(1967, p. 119).
51. Henry Clay’s speech on the “Removal of Deposits,” December 30, 1833. Register of
Debates, 21st Cong., 1st sess., p. 94.was the most salient issue for American voters. The contest between Clay
and Jackson, and the longer struggle between Whigs and Democrats, was
fought over classic commonwealth concerns: executive usurpation, the
monied conspiracy, corporations, and the appropriate role of government
in promoting economic development. The major issues between Democ-
rats and Whigs were economic, but the foundation for the debate over eco-
nomic policy was a larger debate over systematic corruption.
Jackson’s administration resolved two of the paradoxes of American
democracy. First, from Jackson onward, demagogues were accepted, as
long as they were elected President.52 Jackson permanently increased the
power of the Executive branch. He claimed that the President most eﬀec-
tively represented the collective will of the entire people, as shown in the
only nationwide election. Second, political parties became an accepted
part of the political system. Suspicion of partisan motivation and the dan-
gers of faction and party remain to the present day, of course.53But the na-
tional government could not resolve the third paradox—corruption and
the promotion of economic development. Jackson’s solution to corruption
in banking was to not have a bank. He extended the existing federal policy
of inaction. Except in the earliest days of the Washington administration,
the national government, Congress and executive, were unable to design or
execute a program of active government promotion of economic develop-
ment.
Promotion of economic development was left to the states. By the end of
Jackson’s second term, states throughout the country were deeply involved
in investing in and promoting banks and transportation systems. The in-
vestment boom of the 1830s was ended by the depression that began in
1839. By 1842, eight states and the territory of Florida were in default. The
crisis in public ﬁnance naturally brought investigations into its causes.
Venal corruption caused ﬁscal problems in a few states: Mississippi, Flor-
ida, and Arkansas. Most states, however, blamed faulty institutions: they
blamed corruption on how democracy was working out in practice.54
American state governments were the ﬁrst governments of their kind in
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52. Sprague colorfully expanded on the dangers of Jackson. “The people love their consti-
tution, their liberties, and themselves. They are always politically honest....   But they are not
infallible . . . oftentimes a military chieftain, having wrought real or fancied deliverance by
successful battles—fervent gratitude, unbounded admiration, the best feelings of our nature,
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sess., on the Removal of the Deposits, January 29, 1834, Register of Debates, pp. 386–87.
53. Hofstader (1968) is particularly illuminating on the rise of parties and the role played
by Martin Van Buren in the process of rationalizing the need for parties in a democracy.
54. See Wallis, Sylla, and Grinath (2004) for a description of the default crisis and a dis-
cussion of its causes. We explicitly consider the role played by naivete and corruption and ﬁnd
that most states were neither. For examples of corruption, both systematic and venal, in
American states between 1790 and 1860 and its eﬀect on ﬁnancial system development, see
Wallis (forthcoming).history. Governed by written constitutions, they operated within the
framework of a national government that provided military defense and in-
ternational relations, a basic legal system, and very little else. States be-
lieved that republican government was good. They wanted to promote eco-
nomic growth, but they worried incessantly that the corporations and
privileges they created for that purpose beneﬁtted a favored few to the
detriment of the many and undermined the integrity of their governments.
States were forced to solve the paradox of corruption and the promotion
of economic development. Their solution was elegantly simple: let every-
body have a corporate charter who wants one.
Their history endowed American state governments and their citizens
with the idea that some problems of government were not caused by bad
men, but by bad governments. They were Aristotelian and Polybian in their
understanding that the constitution of a government, the stamina vitae,
created incentives for the actors, politicians, and citizens to pursue partic-
ular ends. They were the ﬁrst modern people to possess extensive experi-
ence with written constitutions.55 The early nineteenth century was an era
of continual political debate about the structure of government.
States were the ﬁrst governments with extensive experience in chartering
corporations. The ﬁrst and most important connections between govern-
ments and corporations were ﬁscal. This was true in Britain, with the mer-
cantilist privileges that Adam Smith complained about. It was true in the
American states from the beginning. If governments were going to sell mo-
nopoly privileges and corporate charters for revenue, then inevitably each
charter required a price, a negotiation, a bargain.56 This was a feature of
any system of government where charters created limited entry into a line
of business. Democratic governments could create and sell corporate priv-
ileges. Taxpayers liked receiving government services paid for by charter
fees, taxes on capital, or dividends on stock. But by its very nature the cre-
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55. By the 1830s most of the original states had experience with two or more state consti-
tutional conventions and the state ratifying conventions for the national constitution. Only
North Carolina and Massachusetts stayed with their ﬁrst constitution through the Civil War.
By 1860, states had written the following number of constitutions: Connecticut, two;
Delaware, three; Georgia, three; Maryland, two; New Hampshire, three; New Jersey, two;
New York, three; Pennsylvania, three; South Carolina, three; Vermont, two; Virginia, three.
Of the new states: Kentucky, two; Tennessee, two; Maine was part of Massachusetts until
1820, when it wrote a new constitution. In addition to the new constitutions, there were
several constitutional conventions that produced constitutions that were not ratiﬁed by the
voters.
56. Andrew Jackson’s ﬁrst complaint in his veto of the proposed charter renewal for the
Second Bank of the United States was that the government wasn’t getting a good enough deal:
“Every monopoly and all exclusive privileges are granted at the expense of the public, which
ought to receive a fair equivalent....  I f  our Government must sell monopolies, it would seem
to be its duty to take nothing less than their full value, and if gratuities must be made once in
ﬁfteen of twenty years let them not be bestowed on the subjects of a foreign government nor
upon a designated and favored class of men in our own country.” Veto Message, July 10, 1833
(Richardson 1897, pp. 1140–41).ation of corporate privileges created the opportunity for political groups to
create economic privileges that could be used to distort the political pro-
cess. The commonwealthmen claimed that this happened in Britain with
the national debt, it happened in New York with the sale of bank charters
to the political friends of the Albany Regency, it was a systematic feature
of any government that sold corporate privilege. State governments came
to understand that if they remained in the market for selling corporate
charters, if they remained willing to consider developers’ proposals that
promised tax-free provisions of railroads and banks, inevitably some
politicians, even well-meaning politicians, would make some serious mis-
takes. Voters could easily be induced to vote for expenditures that prom-
ised large returns without levying taxes. States also came to understand
that allowing entry reduced the rents associated with corporate privileges,
without eliminating the wider social beneﬁts of creating corporations.
The states’ solution to the paradox of corruption and economic devel-
opment was as simple as it was ingenious. First, states eliminated the pres-
sure to create special corporate privileges by enacting constitutional pro-
visions requiring legislatures to pass general incorporation laws. These
laws allowed unlimited entry into corporate status via an administrative
procedure. Second, states passed constitutional provisions requiring that
all state borrowing required a bond referendum: mandating that the higher
taxes necessary to service the bonds be approved by the voters before the
bonds were issued. Third, most states forbade state and local investment in
private corporations. Between 1841 and 1852, twelve states wrote new con-
stitutions. Eleven of the twelve contained procedural debt restrictions and
eight mandated general incorporation acts. In banking, general incorpo-
ration acts produced free banking (the ﬁrst free banking acts were in
Michigan and New York in 1837 and 1838). Nine states prohibited incor-
poration by special legislative acts altogether, prohibiting state legislatures
from creating corporations with special privileges.57
The point of these reforms was not to eliminate state and local govern-
ment investments in ﬁnance and transportation. Governments could bor-
row as long as they were willing to raise taxes. The reforms were not de-
signed to limit the creation of corporations. General incorporation acts
made it much easier to get a charter. The reforms were designed to reduce
or eliminate the private economic rents that were created when the politi-
cal system limited entry. The reforms intended to reduce the political ma-
nipulation of the economic system, not by making such manipulations
illegal or unconstitutional, but by reducing the payoﬀ to political
machinations. Institutions supporting unlimited entry, free competition,
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57. The history of these constitutional changes is presented in Wallis (2005). The general
relationship between public ﬁnance and corporations is discussed in Wallis (2003). For a his-
tory of incorporation laws see Evans (1948), and for a larger discussion of the nineteenth-
century corporation see Hurst (1970).and competitive markets were put in place by American states in the 1830s
and 1840s. They were the solution to a political problem, not an economic
problem. The eﬀect of the reforms, however, was to put in place a critical
institutional underpinning of modern economies. It was the uniquely
American solution to the paradox of systematic corruption and the pro-
motion of economic development.
1.5 Venal Corruption and Progressive Era Reforms
Almost any history textbook that covers the Progressive era and was
written at least twenty years ago tells how early-twentieth-century
Americans discovered how big business interests were corrupting poli-
tics in quest of special privileges and how an outraged people acted to
reform the perceived evils.
—McCormick (1981, p. 247)
By the Progressive Era, the fear of systematic corruption, the corruption
of economics by politics, had faded. Venal corruption remained, of course,
and, as the title of McCormick’s essay suggests, there was a growing con-
cern with the “discovery that business corrupts politics.” The Civil War, the
rise of an integrated national economy, and the development of a thriving
manufacturing sector all could have unbalanced and corrupted America’s
governments. But they did not produce tyranny or dictatorship, and by the
1890s Americans had become more conﬁdent in the inherent balance and
resilience of their system of government. Corruption no longer seemed to
be an inframarginal threat; the system was no longer at risk. When pro-
gressive reformers complained about the evils of big business’s inﬂuence on
politics, they no longer warned that slavery and tyranny were just around
the corner. Their conﬁdence in the American system was reﬂected in the
constitutional changes made during the era: at the national level the direct
election of senators by popular vote and women’s suﬀrage, and at the state
and local level the spread of initiatives, referendums, and recalls, and the
rise of home rule. Progressive Era constitutional reforms all emphasized an
increased role for popular participation in the political process, reforms
that were unthinkable a century before.
Benjamin Parke DeWitt, progressive reformer and historian, wrote in
his history of the Progressive movement in 1915:
In this widespread political agitation that at ﬁrst sight seems so incoher-
ent and chaotic, there may be distinguished upon examination and anal-
ysis three tendencies. The ﬁrst of these tendencies is found in the insis-
tence by the best men in all political parties that special, minority, and
corrupt inﬂuence in government—national, state, and city—be re-
moved; the second tendency is found in the demand that the structure or
machinery of government, which as hitherto been admirably adapted to
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cult for the few, and easier for the many, to control; and, ﬁnally, the third
tendency is found in the rapidly growing conviction that the functions of
government at present are too restricted and that they must be increased
and extended to relieve social and economic distress. These three ten-
dencies with varying emphasis are seen to-day in the platform and pro-
gram of every political party; they are manifested in the political
changes and reforms that are advocated and made in the nation, state,
and the cities; and because of the universality and deﬁniteness, they may
be said to constitute the real progressive movement. (DeWitt 1915,
pp. 4–5)
The ﬁrst Progressive tendency—that special, minority, and corrupt inﬂu-
ence in government be removed—could have been written in Rome in 200
BC, Florence in 1500, London in 1720, Philadelphia in 1787, Albany or In-
dianapolis in the 1840s, or today for that matter. The venal will always be
with us, and venal corruption can only be prevented by eternal vigilance.
The third tendency, a call for government policies to relieve social and eco-
nomic distress, translated into new social programs like workmen’s com-
pensation and mother’s pensions in the 1900s and 1910s, but reached its
full measure in the New Deal.58
The second tendency, to make changes in the structure and machinery
of government, constituted the heart of the Progressive reform agenda.
DeWitt’s language indicates the distance that Progressives had come from
Commonwealthmen. The structure of machinery of government “be so
changed and modiﬁed that it will be more diﬃcult for the few, and easier
for the many, to control.” A century earlier such a suggestion would have
been a call for unbalanced government—in short, a call for corruption.
The Progressive movement was an anticorruption reform movement,
nonetheless it promoted policies the founding fathers would have regarded
as systematically corrupt.
The Progressive movement produced reforms in three distinct constitu-
tional areas. First, the Progressives altered the relationship between cor-
porations and governments through active regulation and changes in char-
tering. Second, they expanded direct participation in government; at the
national level through women’s suﬀrage and the direct election of senators,
and at the state and local level through the initiative, referendum, and re-
call to bring direct democracy into the policy process. Third, they altered
the relationship between state and local governments through home rule
amendments and the local charter movement. These reforms shared sev-
eral elements. They allowed both public and private sector organizations
more ﬂexibility to choose the form of their internal organization. They in-
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New Deal and the end of corruption in relief administration.creased the acceptable range of interaction between government and the
economy, allowing governments to interfere and regulate business, or to
withdraw their regulation. Finally, the entire process was to be monitored
by more democracy, by putting more power in the hands of the many. The
Progressives believed in balanced government. But it was the checks and
balances of the national and state constitutions, not the balance of social
orders and classes reﬂecting the interests of the one, the few, and the many.
State chartering policy links the Progressive and Jacksonian eras. The
widespread adoption of general incorporation acts in the 1840s liberalized
access to corporate charters and the number of corporations in America
exploded, relative to both early American history and contemporary Eu-
ropean economies.59But general incorporation acts liberalized entry while
putting more severe restrictions on the structure of corporations. All cor-
porations created under a general act shared common features. In states
that banned special incorporation altogether, a corporation that wanted
to change its internal voting rules, shareholder rights, or its management
structure was severely constrained.60 For example, corporations were typi-
cally prohibited from owning stock in corporations domiciled in other
states. All this began to change in New Jersey in the late 1880s.61
In a series of acts between 1888 and 1896, New Jersey created liberal gen-
eral incorporation. These acts allowed corporations to merge and hold
stock in other corporations, to operate outside of the state, and to deﬁne
their internal governance structure within much wider bounds. Corpora-
tions ﬂocked to New Jersey, swelling the state’s revenues and opening up
new opportunities for corporate structure throughout the country. What
followed was the great merger movement. Between 1895 and 1904 there
was a rapid consolidation of the nation’s largest manufacturing ﬁrms. Over
half of the consolidations involving more than $1 million in capital took
place in New Jersey (Grandy 1989, pp. 678 and 681–83).62 New York and
Delaware soon followed New Jersey’s lead, liberalizing their incorporation
laws and trying to lure businesses into their states.
Attributing the Progressive Era to the merger movement would be silly,
although there is a remarkable coincidence of timing. “Yet, given the long-
term forces involved, it is notable how suddenly the main elements of the
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62. For a general history of the merger wave see Lamoreaux (1985) and Nelson (1959).new political order went into place. The ﬁrst ﬁfteen years of the twentieth
century witnessed most of the changes; more precisely, the brief period
from 1904 to 1908 saw a remarkably compressed political transformation.
During these years the regulatory revolution peaked; new and powerful
agencies of government came into being everywhere” (McCormick 1981,
p. 252). When a small number of unprecedentedly large corporations
sprang into being during the merger wave, the national and state govern-
ments responded to the public perception that corruption was again a
problem in American politics. But they responded much diﬀerently in the
ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century than they did in the nineteenth cen-
tury.
Giving more control to the many was the mechanism by which “special,
minority, and corrupt inﬂuence in government—national, state, and
city—[could] be removed” (DeWitt 1915). The constitutional machinery
of the progressive constitutional reforms were electoral and democratic. At
the national level, the direct election of senators by popular majorities and
suﬀrage for women were the key progressive accomplishments. At the state
level, the adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall gave voters di-
rect control over legislation and oﬃcials. Initiative, referendum, and recall
were adopted at the local level as well, but the critical change was the wide-
spread adoption of home rule provisions and new methods of chartering
local governments. These transferred control of local governments from
state to local governments, providing voters with the ability to directly
shape local government policies to suit the ends of local majorities.
Battling venal corruption and regulating the excesses of the plutocrats
charged the Progressive movement with a populist morality and a renewed
faith in majoritarian democracy. It is striking how much of the Progressive
rhetoric, perhaps in combination with the symbols of the temperance
movement, focuses on bad men rather than on bad institutions. The med-
icine prescribed by progressives to cure corruption would have seemed in-
sane to a founding father. Systematic corruption ﬂowed from the ability of
politicians to use the economic system to further their political ends. Elec-
toral excess, tyranny of the majority, and mob rule were serious threats that
had to be balanced by the creation of other centers of power in the politi-
cal system. Progressive reforms celebrated popular sovereignty, the con-
cept that the voters were the ultimate judges of government policy. Decid-
ing whether politicians and policies were venally corrupt could be left to
popular choice. The many would decide whether the few had violated their
mandate to govern on behalf of the common good. Majorities really would
rule.
How could this happen? One constant element in earlier discussions of
systematic corruption in America and Britain was that it inevitably leads
to tyranny and slavery. Such language is not to be found in the Progressive
Era. Between 1840 and 1890 American crossed a divide. On the early side
54 John Joseph Wallisof the divide governments could never be trusted. Politicians would always,
if the chance presented itself, use the powers of government to manipulate
the economic system in order to consolidate their control of the political
system. Consolidation of political control upset the delicate balance of
government and, with Polybian certainty, led to tyranny and slavery. Bal-
ance in government could never be assumed. Small changes in the distri-
bution of power could quickly lead to imbalance. The defense of liberty
required eternal vigilance. On the later side of the divide, balance in gov-
ernment is no longer fragile. Tyranny and slavery are still possibilities, but
highly improbable ones. By allowing, indeed mandating, more competi-
tion and entry into the economic and political system, Madison’s extended
republic, as modiﬁed by the states, had produced a stable balance within
government.
In classic commonwealth political theory, increasing government regu-
lation raised as many red ﬂags as did special corporate charters. Regulation
created the opportunity for creating rents, and rent creation created the
possibility for political manipulation of the economy. One could see James
I or Charles II supporting Progressive policies, not Whig commonwealth-
men. If, on the other hand, political and economic competition limit rent
creation and dissipation, they also make it safer for the government to reg-
ulate in positive and negative ways. Competition and entry create their own
balanced equilibrium.
This could only have happened if Americans came to trust their gov-
ernment more than they ever had in the colonial, revolutionary, or early
national periods.63 Progressive Era reforms increased political entry by
widening the scope of popular democratic political institutions: direct
election of senators, women’s suﬀrage, the initiative, the referendum, the
recall, and home rule. At the same time, Progressive Era policy reforms
created much wider opportunities for rent-seeking by politicians and eco-
nomic actors, trusting, apparently, that voters could monitor the new pow-
ers given to their representatives. The threat of systematic corruption, so
prevalent for three centuries in British and American political and eco-
nomic thinking, had receded to the point of disappearance from the polit-
ical debates of the Progressive Era.
1.6 The End of Systematic Corruption
One way to think about developing countries is that they are poor because
their government oﬃcials are venally corrupt. If only the right people and
policies could be put in place, economic growth would ensue. A more pes-
simistic and realistic view is that developing countries are systematically
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63. This “trust” is historically relative; Americans retain a profound ability to mistrust gov-
ernment.corrupt. They are plagued by governments that systematically manipulate
the economy to produce economic rents to further the political interests of
the people and parties in power. This is not a matter of bad people causing
problems. This is a fundamental ﬂaw in the constitutional structure, the
stamina vitae, of these societies.
The United States came by its fear of systematic corruption legitimately.
It was born in a constitutional crisis rooted in Whig paranoia about the
threat to fundamental liberties of all Britons embodied in the executive
usurpation of Parliamentary independence. The emerging institutions of
modern ﬁnancial capitalism—a national debt, a central bank, a stock mar-
ket, and a host of ﬁnancial intermediaries—were not the causes of corrup-
tion. The institutions of modern ﬁnancial capitalism were the instruments
of systematic corruption, tools in the hands of the Crown and its evil min-
isters. British corruption threatened fundamental liberties. The storm
warnings of tyranny and slavery were ﬂying in 1776. Today, of course, we
see the eighteenth century as the dawning of a new era of personal and eco-
nomic liberty that produced modern economies and societies. Early Amer-
icans could not aﬀord to be complacent.
The founding fathers seized the ﬁrst chance to write their own constitu-
tions in 1776, crafting a series of state constitutions implementing precepts
of balanced government. They didn’t get it right the ﬁrst time. Between
1776 and 1852 the original thirteen states wrote twenty-nine constitutions
and the national government wrote two. Congress implemented Hamil-
ton’s ﬁnancial plan in 1791, deliberately modeled on the British ﬁnancial
system: a national debt, a central bank, and assumption of state debts.
Within a year, national politics fragmented over the charge that Hamilton
and the Federalists were establishing a Prime Ministry with Hamilton at
the center of a web of inﬂuence and interest. The national government re-
mained gridlocked for decades over how, and whether, economic develop-
ment should be promoted. When the national government’s experiment
in central banking came to an end with Jackson’s veto of the charter of
theBank of the United States in 1832, the issue was still systematic corrup-
tion. Clay claimed that “we shall die—ignobly die—base, mean, and ab-
ject slaves; the scorn and contempt of mankind; unpitied, unwept, un-
mourned!” if Jackson went unchecked.
Meanwhile, in the 1790s states began chartering banks, churches, and all
varieties of corporations. By the 1820s states were building canals, experi-
menting with railroads, borrowing money, and investing their own funds in
corporations. By the 1830s there were over 600 state-chartered banks, and
state debt for internal improvement investment was double the national
debt accumulated during the Revolution and the War of 1812. State ac-
tivism did not go unchallenged. Corporations were still regarded as poten-
tial vehicles for corruption. Bank chartering under New York’s Albany Re-
gency was a classic example of systematic corruption: a political faction
56 John Joseph Wallisusing the creation of economic privilege to secure its control of the politi-
cal system. The central theme in Jackson’s rise to prominence was an attack
on corruption, an attack on government-created privilege. Of course, most
American governments were not thoroughly systematically corrupt, but
there were warning signs everywhere, New York included. Americans did
not fear that their governments were corrupt: they worried that their gov-
ernments would become corrupt if they did not take measures to protect
and strengthen the institutions that supported balanced government.
When the internal improvement boom collapsed after 1839, states care-
fully reexamined the policies that had led them to issue $200 million in state
bonds. States again turned to their constitutions and implemented a series
of reforms that mandated general incorporation acts guaranteeing free en-
try into corporate privileges, modiﬁed the procedures by which state and
local governments borrowed money, and prohibited government invest-
ment in private corporations. With few exceptions, the constitutional re-
forms were not bans on state promotion of economic development. They
did not prevent governments from chartering banks, building canals or
railroads, or, in the Progressive Era, building municipal water systems,
sewer systems, and school systems. Constitutional reforms were explicitly
designed to cut away the roots of systematic corruption, by limiting the
government’s ability to create economic rents through limiting entry and
granting special economic privileges.
Republican and Federalists in the 1790s, Whigs and Democrats in the
1840s, were just as concerned with venal corruption as the Progressives in
the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth century. But venal corruption was not the
most dangerous problem facing America before the Civil War. Tyranny
and slavery were all around the world of the early nineteenth century.
France went from absolute monarchy, to revolution, to dictatorship, and
back to monarchy. Spain’s New World empire collapsed in a wave of revo-
lutions, many inspired by the United State’s example. New World revolu-
tionary governments often adopted constitutions explicitly modeled on
the United States, checks and balances and separation of powers included.
But tyranny, not liberty, was typically the fruit of revolution in Latin and
South America. Americans feared that any movement away from balanced
government would bring, with Polybian certainty, an erosion of republican
government and the rise of tyranny and slavery.
By 1890, however, not only was the American experiment in limited gov-
ernment a demonstrable success, but the country’s institutions had per-
sisted through a bloody civil war, with liberty intact and chattel slavery
ended. Fear of tyranny and slavery was justiﬁably receding. A modern in-
dustrial economy and the world’s largest integrated market posed a new set
of problems for governments. After tentative ﬁrst steps at economic regu-
lation in the 1870s and 1880s, the national government eﬄoresced in the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, as the papers in this volume show so
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have seemed insane to the founding fathers, Federalist and Republican.
Such regulation opened up vistas of rent creation beyond the imagination
of James I or Charles II.
Yet, for all the fear of corruption that ﬁlled the rhetoric of Progressive
reformers, the corruption documented so ably in this volume is distinctly
venal corruption. The Progressives were not afraid that a faction within
government would use the creation of economic privileges to seize control
of the government. They were concerned that economic interests were
using their growing size to wrest concessions from governments. They
worried about the eﬃciency of American government, about the quality of
representation, of equity, access, and fairness. They worried that econom-
ics corrupted politics. They did not worry about politics corrupting eco-
nomics.
The landmark accomplishment of the western democracies in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries has been the creation of stable, limited gov-
ernment. No society with a systematically corrupt political system has lim-
ited government. The economic system is always at risk, entry is limited,
competition is fettered, and economic policies are shaped by politicians to
maintain their political control of the government. Crony capitalism is not
a manifestation of venal corruption—it is a symptom of systematic cor-
ruption. Developing countries do not have markets that work well, because
the open access and competition necessary to make impersonal markets
work cannot ﬂourish when entry is limited to create the privileges that hold
the political system together. What lessons does the United States have to
teach about corruption? The fundamental lesson is how to construct a gov-
ernment that does not depend on manipulation of the economy for its con-
tinued existence.
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